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Abstract
Recent theoretical contributions have suggested consumption externalities, or peer-
group eﬀects, as a potential explanation for some of the puzzles in macroeconomics and
ﬁnance. However, the empirical relevance of peer eﬀects for intertemporal consumption
choice is a completely open question. To shed some light on the issue, we derive an exten-
sion of the standard life-cycle model that allows for consumption externalities. The analysis
is complicated by the challenge of disentangling actual peer eﬀects from merely correlated
eﬀects operating through common features or shocks within peer groups. We show how
to conduct reliable inference under these circumstances based on within-group equilibrium
conditions that give rise to a social multiplier. This approach can be understood as an
adaptation of Manski’s "reﬂection problem framework" to the case of dynamic models with
endogenous regressors. We estimate our model using US panel data from the PSID. While
there is strong predictable consumption co-movement within peer groups, the evidence for
true consumption externalities vanishes once correlated eﬀects are adequately accounted
for.
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Recent theoretical contributions have suggested consumption externalities, or peer-group ef-
fects, as a potential explanation for some of the puzzles in macroeconomics and ﬁnance. Despite
its intuitive appeal, however, the idea of peer eﬀects in intertemporal consumption choice has
not been put to the empirical test.
To shed some light on the issue, we derive an extension of the standard life-cycle model that
allows for consumption externalities. Speciﬁcally, we focus on a "keeping up with the Joneses"
speciﬁcation of individual utility. Our question is whether the choice of optimal consumption
proﬁl e si sa ﬀected by the simultaneous consumption decisions of households with similar char-
acteristics. The analysis is complicated by what is known as the "reﬂection problem", i.e. the
challenge of disentangling actual peer eﬀects from merely correlated eﬀects operating through
common features or shocks within peer groups. We show how to conduct reliable inference
under these circumstances based on within-group equilibrium conditions that give rise to a
social multiplier. This approach can be understood as an adaptation of Manski’s reﬂection
problem framework to the case of dynamic models with endogenous regressors.
We estimate our model using US panel data from the PSID. Reference groups are con-
structed on the basis of age, education, gender, race and urbanity. Although our results show
strong predictable consumption co-movement within such reference groups, the evidence for
true consumption externalities vanishes once correlated eﬀects are adequately accounted for.
Thus our study does not lend support to the widespread use of theoretical speciﬁcations as-
suming pronounced peer eﬀects in intertemporal consumption choice.
11 Introduction
Consumption is arguably a social experience, and the position of other people with respect to
our own consumption may often matter to us. This is reﬂected, for example, in notions like
”conspicuous consumption”, ”peer-group eﬀects” or "keeping up with the Joneses," which are
commonplace in casual discussions about the determinants of particular consumption patterns.
In line with this, psychologists, sociologists, and economists have collected evidence showing
that consumers’ well-being is aﬀected by their relative economic standing rather than their ab-
solute resources alone.1 Early discussions of consumption externalities in economics date back
at least to the seminal contributions of Duesenberry (1949) and Leibenstein (1950). It is thus
very surprising that economists have largely ignored the issue when modelling intertemporal
consumption choice.
Indeed, some "stylized facts" about life-cycle consumption seem suggestive of or at least
compatible with peer eﬀects. Rather than being smooth, life-cycle proﬁles of household con-
sumption feature humps and bumps whose exact shapes appear to depend on characteristics
of the respective households. Clearly this could be a consequence of changing demographic
situations that have a direct eﬀect on the utility derived from a given level of consumption.2
However, we would expect to observe similarly synchronized consumption patterns within rel-
evant peer groups if consumption externalities are important. Given the empirical support
for peer-group eﬀects in other ﬁelds, their relevance for life-cycle consumption decisions surely
deserves closer investigation.
In this paper, we therefore study the role of consumption externalities in intertemporal
consumption choice. We begin by proposing a theoretical model of consumption that allows for
peer-group eﬀects. Instead of introducing an ad hoc behavioral model, we extend the standard
life-cycle model to account for the notion of ”keeping up with the Joneses” in individual felicity
functions. Thus, our model is well-grounded in the usual suppositions about human greed and
rationality and fully consistent with the forward-looking utility maximization framework as
presented, for example, in Browning and Crossley (2001). Apart from providing a coherent
economic foundation for our exercise, doing so has the additional advantage that our results
are easily compared to those obtained from more traditional versions of the model. Speciﬁcally,
our speciﬁcation nests the standard power utility model as well as its demographics-augmented
variant as special cases. This allows us to construct simple tests for peer-group eﬀects within
the traditional life-cycle framework.
In order to evaluate the model empirically, we derive its ﬁrst-order condition, an extended
version of the well-known consumption Euler equation, and estimate it using US micro data
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Standard Euler equation estimation un-
covers substantial predictable consumption co-movement within peer groups, suggesting the
1A recent example is Luttmer (2004), who also provides further references to this quite sizable literature.
2Already Deaton (1992) suggests some modiﬁcations of the standard life-cycle model to take account of
household demographic structure or nonseparabilities between consumption and leisure. Attanasio et al. (1999)
represents a nice example of such an approach.
2presence of possibly strong consumption externalities. However, results obtained under the
usual Euler equation framework have to be taken with caution, because estimation is vulner-
able to even minor misspeciﬁcations. The issue is related to what Manski (1993, 1995) calls
the ”reﬂection problem”. Basically, to identify and estimate true externalities, we need to
discriminate between two competing hypotheses: Is individual consumption growth actually
aﬀected by peer-group behavior (endogenous eﬀects) or does it display co-movement within
peer groups merely because individuals share similar unobserved characteristics or suﬀer simi-
lar predictable shocks (correlated eﬀects)? Disentangling these two phenomena constitutes the
principal challenge when confronting our model with the data. The solution we propose is based
on exploiting a social multiplier. Speciﬁcally, we adapt Manski’s reﬂection problem to the case
of dynamic Euler equations with endogenous regressors. This step allows us to derive further
equilibrium conditions implied by our extended model which can be used to re-assess peer
eﬀects in intertemporal consumption and provide a more robust test of their relevance. Per-
haps surprisingly, once correlated eﬀects are adequately accounted for, our estimation results
indicate that there is not much evidence for substantial consumption externalities.
Apart from the aforementioned early contributions that have inspired this paper, our re-
search is also related to a number of diﬀerent strands in the more recent literature. First,
our analysis extends traditional studies of intertemporal consumption proﬁles based on micro
data by allowing for the presence of peer-group eﬀects. Previous research has shown that a
"stripped down" power utility version of the model cannot explain key features of the life-cycle
proﬁle of consumption. However, some progress has been achieved with the inclusion of demo-
graphic preference shifters, as suggested, for example, by Blundell et al. (1994) or Attanasio
et al. (1999). The fact that our approach nests this class of models is helpful in that we can
assess the importance of peer-groups eﬀects while controlling for the direct impact of relevant
(common) demographics. In the same literature, there have also been a few contributions de-
voted to "internal" habit formation, i.e. persistent eﬀects of an individual’s own consumption
experience over time. Yet, the empirical evidence for internal habits is mixed at best (see, for
instance, Dynan (2000), Guariglia and Rossi (2002), Alessie and Teppa (2002), and Browning
and Collado (2004)). Our approach is diﬀerent from these contributions, because we focus on
"external" habit formation: rather than looking at current consumption relative to past con-
sumption for a given individual, we investigate the relationship between an individual’s current
consumption and that of her peers.
A second related strand of the literature is concerned with intra-period consumption pat-
terns. In fact, most of the studies investigating peer eﬀects in consumption have looked at com-
modity demand. Building on theoretical work of Gaertner (1974) and Pollak (1976), Alessie
and Kapteyn (1991) and Kapteyn et al. (1997), for instance, have shown that peer eﬀects are
important for estimating budget share equations. In essence, their work can be understood as
referring to the second stage of a two-stage budgeting procedure. Our study, in turn, focuses on
the ﬁrst stage - the intertemporal allocation of consumption - thereby complementing previous
research concerned with intra-period demand systems only.
3Third, our analysis should be informative regarding the empirical relevance of recent the-
oretical contributions that have suggested consumption externalities such as ”catching” or
”keeping up with the Joneses” as potential solutions to empirical puzzles in macroeconomics
and ﬁnance.3 Indeed, the macroeconomic literature has readily adopted various kinds of inter-
nal and external habit speciﬁcations for intertemporal consumption, although evidence from
microeconomic studies is scarce or absent.
Lastly, we contribute to the literature on identiﬁcation and estimation of social eﬀects4
by adapting Manski’s reﬂection problem framework to a dynamic setting with endogenous
regressors. In particular, we demonstrate how the equilibrium conditions derived in Manski
(1993, 1995) translate into additional restrictions for dynamic Euler equations that can be
exploited to improve estimation and inference.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is preparatory and reviews
the standard life-cycle model, which we extend, in section 3, to allow for peer eﬀects. In section
4, we present our data and describe the way we construct peer groups. This is followed by
a detailed exposition of econometric issues in section 5, where we derive our model speciﬁca-
tion and discuss identiﬁcation and inference. In section 6, we turn to our results and their
interpretation. Section 7 concludes with some ﬁnal remarks. Less instructive derivations and
econometric technicalities are relegated to the appendix.
2T h e L i f e - c y c l e M o d e l
In this section we brieﬂy review the main features of the canonical life-cycle model of con-
sumption. This model, which undoubtedly represents the cornerstone in modern literature on
consumption, also forms the conceptual basis for our own study.
Consider the intertemporal optimization problem of an inﬁnitely-lived consumer at time t
who faces a riskless asset with real after-tax rate of return Rt+1. Assume that the consumer
has von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences and derives utility from consumption C,w i t hi n t r a -
period felicity function u. Assume further that the consumer’s rate of time preference is β. We









subject to an intertemporal budget constraint; Et denotes the conditional expectations operator






3Prominent examples of this line of research include Abel (1990), Gali (1994), Campbell and Cochrane
(1999), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) or Binder and Pesaran (2001).
4See e.g. Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Manski (2000) for further references.
4The left-hand side represents the immediate loss in utility if the consumer marginally increases
her asset holdings in t. The right-hand side is the increase in (discounted expected) utility she
obtains from the corresponding extra asset payoﬀ in t +1 . At an optimum, marginal gains
and losses must be exactly equal. Straightforward as it is, this ﬁrst-order condition of the
intertemporal maximization problem is at the core of the life-cycle model throughout all its
variants. Intuitively, a rational and farsighted individual aims at smoothing marginal utility
throughout her life.
3 Peer-group Eﬀects in the Euler Equation Framework
The standard way to proceed is to parameterize the felicity function u(·), notably by assuming
preferences of the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) type. Estimation is then based on
a log-linearized version of (2). In the present paper, we slightly depart from this practice and
instead follow an approach ﬁrst suggested by Attanasio and Browning (1995). Their idea is to
start directly from a model for marginal utility u0 (·) (or the natural logarithm thereof) that
allows for more ﬂexible while still tractable preference speciﬁc a t i o n s . H e n c ew ea r ea b l et o
test for the importance of peer-group eﬀects without relying on an overly restrictive modelling
context. As Attanasio and Browning (1995) emphasize, the approach comes at a low cost, since
it is still possible to recover the implied utility function by means of integration, if so desired.
Likewise, the approach is well-grounded in consumption theory insofar as the empirical model
we postulate nests the standard CRRA case with or without additional preference shifters. To
illustrate this point, appendix A1 shows how our framework easily accommodates an extended
version of the typical CRRA model with peer eﬀects.
With respect to Attanasio and Browning (1995), our central innovation is to add the pos-
sibility of consumption externalities into the model. Thus, apart from the key determinants
of marginal utility already considered by them, we here allow marginal utility to be also af-
fected by the current consumption level of likely peers. Speciﬁcally, we assume that individual






































t represents a vector of basic household characteristics that act as preference shifters,
e.g. family size or the number of children. As mentioned before, including such preference
shifters is essential for every attempt to take the model to micro data, because consumption is
measured at the household level, whereas theory focuses on the individual.
Next, lnCh













denotes the arithmetic mean of the log consumption levels within household h’s peer group, i.e.
among households with the same demographic characteristics Xh
t . Intuitively, while marginal
utility is assumed to decline in the individual’s own consumption level, we posit that it may
5also depend on current peer-group consumption,5 capturing notions of status concern or jeal-
ousy. Thus, our speciﬁcation allows for intertemporal consumption complementarities between
similar households.6 The central parameter of interest is γ, which captures the strength of
possible peer eﬀects.
Although it may ﬁrst seem ad hoc, the speciﬁcation given by (3) is really but a slight
extension of the standard power utility model. Accordingly, the basic "stripped down" CRRA
model is nested as a special case for θ = γ =0 . This is important, since it allows us to construct
simple t- or F-tests for consumption externalities against more traditional alternatives.
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where α contains both the logarithm of the discount rate, β, and higher-order terms stemming
from the linearization. The demographic preference shifters Dh
t+1 now show up in diﬀerences,
corresponding to the notion that changes in, say, household size or the number of children
should have an eﬀect on the household’s growth rate of consumption.
It seems worthwhile to provide some intuition for the above Euler equation. After control-
ling for the eﬀect of demographics, household consumption growth is seen to depend on the
interest rate and on average peer-group consumption growth. The eﬀect of the interest rate,
on the one hand, reﬂects an intertemporal substitution motive standard in intertemporal Euler
equations. Peer-group consumption growth, on the other hand, is included because house-
holds may aim at smoothing their own consumption proﬁle relative to that of their peers. One
important insight from (4) is that the goal of "keeping up with the Joneses" does not imply
excessive current consumption to increase social status. Rather, since the intertemporal budget
constraint requires any increase in current consumption to be balanced against lower future
consumption, rational forward-looking individuals attempt to maintain their relative position
within their peer group as a means of smoothing their marginal utility.
At this point, one additional modiﬁcation is necessary for us to be able to achieve our
goal of testing for peer-group eﬀects. In fact, from looking at (4), one might (and should) be
concerned that estimates of γ will pick up spurious correlation rather than true consumption
externalities. Speciﬁcally, direct eﬀects of the stratiﬁcation variables X on chosen consumption
growth could be falsely interpreted as evidence for peer eﬀects. As an example, one might
think that diﬀerent degrees of education imply diﬀerent degrees of impatience, i.e. higher or
lower discount rates β. As such a phenomenon would concern the whole peer group, similar
5In a previous version of the paper, we also analyzed a possible eﬀect of lagged peer-group consumption on
an individual’s current marginal utility. However, our estimations, which are readily handled within a standard
IV framework, did not yield any evidence for such ”catching up with the Joneses” in individual preferences.
6Note that (3) implicitly treats peer-group consumption at the household level as a potential determinant
of marginal utility. Theoretically, it is possible to also incorporate demographic preference shifters in the peer-
g r o u pt e r ms oa st oa d j u s tf o rh o u s e h o l ds i z e .H o w e v e r ,such a model would seem to cause formidable inference
problems in practice, while it is not even entirely clear a priori which of the two approaches is more plausible.
7See appendix A2 for a complete derivation of equation (4).
6behavior could easily be mistaken as evidence for peer eﬀects, whereas the true explanation
rests on correlated eﬀects related to observable demographics. In order to distinguish between
these two potential phenomena, we control for the direct eﬀects of our stratiﬁcation variables
by including them as additional regressors. This approach neatly accommodates two diﬀerent
strands of the literature. First, we comply with the ”reﬂection problem” framework proposed
by Manski (1993, 1995) to allow for both endogenous and correlated eﬀects in what Manski
refers to as a "linear endogenous-eﬀects model". Second, we take up the reasoning put forward
in part of the consumption literature8 that, apart from the preference shifters Dh
t already
introduced above, demographics also have to be used to allow a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation of
the discount rate. Thus, by including the additional term Xh
t λ, we implicitly parameterize
lnβ, which was previously buried in the intercept.
Ad i ﬀerent issue is the likely presence of common unpredictable shocks, e.g. shocks to the
income of particular groups or sudden correlated changes in preferences. At ﬁrst sight it might
seem that such shocks would confound our analysis. However, none of these unpredictable
events represent a problem for our purposes, given that peer group consumption - an endogenous
variable - will be instrumented with lagged information throughout. In this sense, importantly,
we are only dealing with predictable or planned co-movement of consumption.






















Equation (5) is the starting point for our estimation strategy. As a practical matter, we will
compute cell averages for a given set of discretized stratiﬁcation variables to obtain nonpara-







. Note that we must compute these cell averages
for each year t. This implies that estimated peer-group means of any endogenous variable
have to be treated themselves as endogenous variables with respect to the time dimension.
Consequently, such variables will have to be instrumented. This is important to keep in mind
when studying intertemporal Euler equations, which typically comprise several endogenous



























, gives rise to a generated regressor
problem.
It is worth emphasizing that the consumers’ Euler equations are necessary conditions for any
equilibrium within our framework. Building the analysis on such Euler equations, therefore,
has the considerable advantage that it allows us to estimate the relevant preference parame-
ters without a full characterization of the particular equilibrium. However, a requirement for
identiﬁcation in this context is that there exist at least one variable that aﬀects individual
but not peer-group consumption growth. In our case, the necessary variation is provided by
within-peer-group variation in the demographic preference shifters and/or the after-tax interest
8Prominent examples include Lawrance (1991), Attanasio and Browning (1995) and Dynan (2000).
7rate. Speciﬁcally, the demographic preference shifters exploit the fact that consumers aim at
smoothing expected discounted marginal utility, while the potential peer eﬀect is formulated
with respect to household consumption. After-tax interest rate heterogeneity, in turn, exploits
potential diﬀerences in the intertemporal substitution motive within peer groups. These two
features also distinguish the model in (5) from tests of full consumption insurance with perfect
capital markets and pareto-eﬃcient equilibria (see e.g. Mace (1991) and Cochrane (1991)).
At the same time, it is interesting to note that potential peer eﬀects would be identiﬁed
even in the case of full within-peer-group consumption insurance, perfect capital markets and
pareto-optimal equilibrium selection, as long as we analyze externalities based on peer-group
consumption levels rather than marginal utility. Certainly, dropping this assumption would
result in a loss of identiﬁcation in a complete-markets setup. Even then, however, identiﬁcation
could be easily restored within a slightly modiﬁed framework, e.g. by allowing for within peer-
group heterogeneity in the parametric time preference rate.9 Before delving deeper into these
and other identiﬁcation and estimation issues, we ﬁrst introduce our data set and the method
used to construct peer groups.
4T h e D a t a
This section brieﬂy describes the data we use for our study. In addition, we provide a compre-
hensive discussion of how we deﬁne and construct peer groups. We also report some descriptive
statistics about the ﬁnal sample used in the estimation.10
4.1 The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
Our analysis is based on data from the well-known Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
The PSID is a longitudinal survey of a representative sample of US individuals and their fam-
ilies. It has been ongoing since 1968. The data were collected annually through to 1997, and
biennially starting in 1999. As a consequence of low attrition rates, the success in following
young adults as they form their own families, and recontact eﬀorts, the sample size has grown
from 4,800 families in 1968 to more than 7,000 families in 2001. While the PSID has a very
broad content, including economic and demographic as well as sociological and psychological
measures, its coverage of consumption behavior is relatively limited. Indeed, the only mea-
sure of consumption available in the ﬁles is food consumption (at home and in restaurants),
which, moreover, was a recurrent item in the survey questionnaire only between 1974 and 1987.
Accordingly, the PSID oﬀers a maximum of 14 consecutive annual observations to investigate
households’ intertemporal consumption patterns.
9Such a strategy would work since full consumption insurance only implies that the discounted growth rate
of marginal utility is constant across households. Thus, heterogeneity in discount rates within peer groups is
suﬃcient to generate time-varying paths for marginal utility, which provide the necessary variation to identify
the model.
10Details related to necessary data cleaning procedures can be found in appendix A3.
8Having data only on food consumption is an obvious drawback. Speciﬁcally, for our exercise
to be valid, we need to assume separability of utility between food consumption and other
expenditure items. However, we have to make do with the data available, and since the use
of actual panel data covering a reasonably long horizon is crucial for our analysis, we see no
alternative to using the PSID. In particular, synthetic panel data, which are also frequently
used to estimate consumption Euler equations, are not an option. The reason is that such
data are already based on cohort aggregation, thus eliminating one of the key dimensions
along which consumption externalities should be analyzed. Similarly, imputation techniques
like those suggested by Skinner (1987) and Blundell et al. (2005) do not provide a superior
alternative in our case, since identiﬁcation of possible peer eﬀects would ultimately rely on
rather artiﬁcial individual-level variation among members of the same socioeconomic group.
These concerns basically preclude the use of the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), with
its very short four-quarter panel dimension, as a potential data source. Assuming separability
and focusing on food expenditure therefore seems to us a necessary price to be paid, at least as
long as long-horizon panel data containing broader consumption measures are not available.11
As mentioned, the data we use cover the interview period 1974 to 1987. After necessary
deletions, including all households in the so-called "poverty subsample", and some data losses
due to implausible or missing observations, all of which are duly documented in appendix A3,
our data set still comprises roughly 26,000 observations. Based on this sample, we next start
constructing peer groups.
4.2 Peer-group Construction
The speciﬁcation of peer groups is critical for any analysis of social interactions. Most im-
portantly, the reference groups we choose to consider are taken to be characteristic of an
individual’s social environment, so we must take a stance on what personal attributes plausi-
bly deﬁne such an environment. The ideal solution would be to use observed behavior and infer
the most relevant determinants or dimensions of social reference groups directly from the data.
However, as pointed out by Manski (1993, 1995) in his seminal contribution on endogenous
social eﬀects, such an approach would render identiﬁcation impossible and make the social
eﬀects model hold tautologically. Thus he concludes that ”informed speciﬁcation of reference
groups is a necessary prelude to analysis of social eﬀects” (Manski (1993), p. 536). Naturally,
parametric identiﬁcation could also be attained through speciﬁc functional form restrictions on
either the model or the way reference group characteristics are aggregated. We do not follow
this approach here, since in our application functional form restrictions would have neither a
compelling basis in theory nor an intuitive interpretation. Instead, we borrow results from the
literature on group processes and social comparison in social psychology to motivate our sam-
ple stratiﬁcation. Studies of social comparison processes (see, for example, Festinger (1954))
11The lack of better panel data has led to a substantial body of literature using food expenditure to explore
consumer behavior. Examples include Hall and Mishkin (1982), Zeldes (1989), Lawrance (1991), Runkle (1991),
Jacobs (1999) or Dynan (2000), to name just a few.
9emphasize that people primarily compare themselves to members of their own social group,
i.e. to individuals who are similar along dimensions such as age, gender or education. As in
Kapteyn et al. (1997), we will therefore treat individuals that share such basic characteristics
as relevant reference groups.
Given the focus of our exercise, it seems important to account for characteristics related to
social achievement and status. These clearly include age and education - two categories used in
a study by Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998) - but we prefer to also consider other characteristics
that are relevant to an individual’s self-conception like race, gender or urbanity. Hence, we
construct reference groups based on the following attributes characterizing household heads in
our sample: age cohort, race, gender, educational attainment, and ”size of the nearest city” as
a measure for urbanity.12 Speciﬁcally, cell averages are computed using six-year cohorts based
on the household head’s age in 1974; a dummy indicating whether the household head is white
or non-white; a gender dummy; a categorical education variable that takes on one of three
diﬀerent values depending on whether the household head has had less than high school, a high
school degree or a completed college education; and lastly a city size variable that indicates
whether the nearest city has less than 50,000, between 50,000 and 500,000, or more than 500,000
inhabitants. Obviously, the list of strata-deﬁning characteristics could easily be extended. In
a sample of limited size, however, this has to be traded oﬀ against the disadvantage of ending
up with overly small reference groups or substantial data losses. We therefore settle for the
above-mentioned ﬁve criteria.
In order to obtain a meaningful proxy for peer-group means, we consider only strata con-
sisting of at least 15 households in a given year. This choice again represents a compromise
between diﬀerent goals. While larger cell sizes are in principle desirable, they would also imply
more data losses for a given set of stratiﬁcation variables, so we have to strike a balance.13
Even so, the need to delete observations pertaining to overly small reference groups causes a
reduction of our sample to a ﬁnal size of 18,126 observations. Table 1 indicates the number of
observations per year contained in the ﬁnal sample. Similarly, table 2 provides information on
how many peer groups remain in the sample each year and what minimum, maximum, average
and median size they have. In addition, tables 3 and 4 contain basic summary statistics for our
sample before and after the deletion of households belonging to small peer groups. Compari-
son of these tables shows that our sample becomes "more white", "more male" and somewhat
"more educated" and "less urban" as a consequence of data deletions, whereas compositional
12These same variables have also been found to be important predictors for individual welfare functions over
income as studied in the Leyden approach (see e.g. Van Praag and Frijters (1999)), which provides additional
support for our stratiﬁcation strategy.
13Note, however, that our exercise is not subject to the minimum cell size requirements typical of studies
based on synthetic cohort techniques. When constructing synthetic cohorts, researchers inevitably need large
cell sizes to minimize sampling variability in the proxy for consumption growth. Here, we do not face this
problem as we use true panel data. Our only concern is to avoid peer-group means being overly aﬀected by a
few households that could be outliers. For this purpose, using a threshold of 15 seems acceptable. Importantly,
our estimation explicitly takes account of sampling variability at the peer-group level. Moreover, we conduct
robustness checks to assess the sensitivity of our results to the minimum group size chosen.
10changes in terms of birth cohorts are minor. Essentially, imposing a lower bound on cell size
removes most of the households headed by non-whites and women. Although this is of course
unfortunate, we still ﬁnd our ﬁnal sample relatively well-balanced even with respect to other
studies that do not face data constraints associated with peer-group construction. For example,
Table 1: Number of observations by year in final data set*















*Baseline case: Minimum group size: 15.
Table 2: Number and size of reference groups by year
Year No. of Groups Min. Size Max. Size Mean Size Median Size
7 4 - 7 5 4 6 1 5 7 32 7 . 82 4
7 5 - 7 6 4 6 1 5 8 22 9 . 52 6
7 6 - 7 7 4 8 1 5 8 32 8 . 72 4
7 7 - 7 8 4 7 1 5 8 52 9 . 52 4
7 8 - 7 9 4 7 1 5 8 92 7 . 92 4
79-80 44 15 102 30.3 24
80-81 46 15 104 30.7 24
81-82 42 15 109 33.1 25
82-83 40 16 112 34.3 27
83-84 36 15 115 39.3 33
84-85 36 15 112 39.2 33
85-86 36 16 115 40.8 31
86-87 39 15 117 41.3 31





Education less than high school 21.79
high school or more 36.33
finished college or more 41.88
City Size less than 50,000 39.55
between 50,000 and 500,000 38.08
more than 500,000 22.37
Cohort 5-10 0.03









26,358 Total Number of Observations





Education less than high school 14.67
high school or more 36.89
finished college or more 48.44
City Size less than 50,000 45.44
between 50,000 and 500,000 38.09
more than 500,000 16.46
Cohort 5-10 0.00









18,126 Total Number of Observations
12many authors in the consumption literature have dropped female-headed households from their
sample straight away, thus obtaining the same selectivity we are faced with as a result of our
necessary data deletions. In conclusion, our focus on households belonging to suﬃciently big
reference groups implies a natural qualiﬁcation on the interpretation of our results, insofar as
we cannot extrapolate to other subpopulations. Nevertheless, our sample provides interesting
insights about sizeable and important strata of society.
As was stressed before, it is inherent to the nature of the reﬂection problem that speciﬁc
stratiﬁcation approaches cannot be informed or judged by observed behavior without leading to
tautology. It may still be informative to take a ﬁrst look at the correlation between individual
consumption growth and the reference-group counterpart that we have constructed. In fact,
the raw partial correlation is 0.2, more than three times as high as the correlation between
individual and aggregate annual consumption growth in the whole sample (0.06).
5S p e c i ﬁcation, Identiﬁcation, and Inference
5.1 The Reﬂection Problem and Omitted Correlated Eﬀects
In principle it is possible to estimate an equation like (5) using instrumental variables (IV).
Thus we will report the corresponding results below. However, estimation is a rather delicate
issue in this case. In particular, results are probably very sensitive to even minor misspeciﬁca-
tion (or omission) of direct demographic eﬀects. To be sure, we can (and do) control for direct
eﬀects from our stratiﬁcation variables by including these dummies as additional regressors.
This corresponds to a parameterization of the conditional expectation of the error term as
suggested by Manski (1993) and can be interpreted as an auxiliary parametric model for the
consumer’s discount rate. Yet, such direct controls are necessarily imperfect. For one thing,
eﬀects could stem from complicated interactions of the demographic information we use. Fur-
ther, consumption growth might be aﬀected by additional demographic factors omitted from
the model. This will remain a potential problem, even if a speciﬁcation already takes into
a c c o u n ta l lv a r i a b l e st h a th a v eb e e ni d e n t i ﬁed as relevant in the previous literature. In essence,
there is no safe guidance as to what precise set of demographic variables have to be included
in taking the life-cycle theory to the data. In most applications, this point may be a purely
academic one. For our study, however, it is critical, because it further raises the challenge of
discriminating between true consumption externalities and merely correlated eﬀects.
Basically, any omission of direct demographic eﬀects in (5) is likely to cause an upward
bias in the estimate for γ,c o m b i n e dw i t ha nu n i n f o r m a t i v eJ - s t a t i s t i c .T h er e a s o nl i e si nt h e
mechanics of IV estimators. Recall that estimates are obtained from minimizing the (weighted)
correlations between instruments and residuals, i.e. estimated errors. The estimator tends to
purge such components from the residual that are correlated with the instruments. In the
case of equation (5), this may imply that omitted demographic eﬀects or predictable ”common
13shocks” within peer groups are spuriously eliminated by assigning a value near 1 to γ. The
social interactions term thus picks up any omitted eﬀects present at the level of peer groups.
Moreover, although the model is clearly misspeciﬁed in this case, the misspeciﬁcation would be
virtually impossible to detect. In order to understand why the test of overidentifying restrictions
may fail, note that it is based on the minimized objective function of the estimator. Its power
to reject a given speciﬁcation prevails only to the extent that the estimated error term actually
displays suﬃcient correlation with the instruments. Given the above reasoning, it seems fair
to suspect that the J-test may have very low power.
As a bottom line, speciﬁcation (5) is very vulnerable to even minor omissions of relevant
demographic information. Above and beyond what this would imply for any analysis of micro
consumption data, it poses the very concrete problem here that our main coeﬃcient of interest
might easily be upward biased, thus jeopardizing any conclusions about peer-group vs. corre-
lated eﬀects. Importantly, this is true despite the fact that the model is well identiﬁed under
the assumption of correct speciﬁcation and the availability of valid instruments.14
However, the situation is not quite as unfortunate as it might ﬁrst seem. The solution we
propose relies on the fact that optimal consumption growth rates need to be consistent within
peer groups. This insight provides us with a set of additional equilibrium restrictions that can
be exploited to discriminate between our two hypotheses of interest. Speciﬁcally, the additional
equilibrium conditions allow us to transform our model and obtain a new speciﬁcation which
does not suﬀer from the aforementioned shortcomings. The general idea of exploiting an
internal consistency argument goes back to Manski’s (1993, 1995) contributions on how to
circumvent the reﬂection problem in the identiﬁcation of endogenous social eﬀects. Here we
adapt Manski’s framework to the case of IV estimation and inference for Euler equations
featuring contemporaneous consumption externalities.




















































which is referred to as a ”social equilibrium condition” for each stratum. This additional
equilibrium restriction recognizes the fact that the consumption growth terms on both sides of
the Euler equation have to be mutually consistent.
14Note, in fact, that our exercise does not suﬀer from a fundamental identiﬁcation problem like the one
described in Manski (1993, 1995). In his model, all explanatory variables aﬀect the outcome variable directly
as well as through their respective reference group levels. The consequence is perfect collinearity between the
peer-group averages and the other explanatory variables rendering identiﬁcation impossible. In our case, as we
can safely rule out what Manski coins ”contextual eﬀects”, we obtain an exclusion restriction that allows us to
identify the model.























































Thus, the social equilibrium condition (7) implies that, for each population stratum, peer-
group consumption growth depends only on the peer-group means of the other explanatory
variables, i.e. averages of family size changes, the average log after-tax interest rate and
demographics dummies. In order to exploit these additional restrictions, we combine condition
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. Equation (8) will serve as our principal estimating equation.














b a s e do no u rs a m p l e
stratiﬁcation.
Note that (8) provides a much improved basis to estimate actual peer eﬀects and properly
assess model speciﬁcation. Above all, the right—hand side of the equation no longer includes
endogenous peer-group consumption growth as a regressor. Recall that this term is the source of
concern in our initial equation (5), since we suspect that it spuriously picks up any predictable
group-speciﬁc components from the error term.
Some intuition should be provided regarding the way consumption externalities operate in
(8). In fact, these externalities are now estimated from a social multiplier, i.e. the indirect
eﬀects on a peer’s optimal consumption growth operating through peer-group averages of the
standard explanatory variables. To give an example, interest rates are one theoretically undis-
puted determinant of consumption growth. To the extent that higher average interest rates
raise average consumption in an individual’s peer group, they also cause the individual herself
to raise consumption if peer-group eﬀects are present. This explains why the coeﬃcient in front
of the peer-group interest rate variable contains γ. At the same time, equation (8) naturally
accounts for the direct eﬀects of the standard explanatory variables. Speciﬁcally, they are iden-
15tiﬁed provided that there is some household-level variation relative to the peer-group averages.
Consider again the example of interest rates. Many authors have estimated consumption Euler
equations using pre-tax interest rates. Apart from the general qualms one may have about
this approach, following it would actually make it impossible for us to distinguish between the
eﬀect on consumption of the interest rate faced by the individual herself and the one faced by
her peers. Both interest rate terms in (8) would be identical. This gives us a strong rationale
for using after-tax interest rates Rt+1 as regressors. Finally, we can also identify correlated
eﬀects as captured in Xh
t .T h ec o e ﬃcient γ being identiﬁed from the social multipliers, we can










λ that stem from the consumption externality. Thus,
the reﬂection problem framework allows us to conduct proper inference with respect to all
parameters of interest.
As a practical matter, however, the above discussion also suggests that estimation remains
a challenge, especially since the variation we can exploit to estimate consumption externalities
must come from within peer groups. Moreover, some of the explanatory variables such as the
interest rate are endogenous. These variables (and their respective peer-group averages) need
to be instrumented, which reduces the necessary variation even further. Hence, it may be
diﬃcult to obtain very precise estimates of the parameters of interest.
5.2 Explanatory Variables and Instrument Choice
5.2.1 Explanatory Variables
In order to estimate Euler equations on micro data, it is essential to properly account for real-
life heterogeneity and demographic variation. Indeed, the basic life-cycle model is formulated
at the level of an ahistorical individual, whereas actual data refer to households with speciﬁc
demographic patterns and a ﬁnite lifetime. At a minimum, most economists have considered
changes in household size as an important determinant of consumption growth.15 We follow
the literature by including family size, the number of major adults and the number of children
as preference shifters Dt+1 in our parameterization for marginal utility, (3). Accordingly, the
Euler equations (4), (5) and (8) include changes in these demographic variables as additional
regressors.
Moreover, as already discussed above, we take up the reasoning of Lawrance (1991) and
others and include further demographics directly in the Euler equation to allow for diﬀerences in
time preference rates across diﬀerent subpopulations. Note that this is crucial in our application
in order to distinguish endogenous social eﬀects from correlated eﬀects, i.e. direct eﬀects of the
stratiﬁcation variables on the dependent variable. Speciﬁcally, since Lawrance (1991) argues
that some of our stratiﬁcation variables could be associated with large diﬀerences in time
preference rates across subpopulations, we include all our stratiﬁcation variables as explanatory
15Prominent examples include Attanasio and Weber (1993, 1995), Attanasio and Browning (1995), Attanasio
et al. (1999) or Dynan (2000). See Deaton (1992) or Attanasio (1999) for an overview.
16variables in equation (5). Hence, Xt comprises race, gender, education and cohort dummies
as well as the city size dummies for diﬀerent degrees of urbanity. As a proxy for the riskless
asset return Rt+1, we use the real after-tax one year US T-Bill rate, constructed as the average
of twelve year-to-year rates. Lastly, we construct peer-group averages of all the explanatory
variables since these are needed for estimating (8).
5.2.2 Instrument Choice
All of our estimating equations contain some endogenous regressors. In particular, the real
after-tax interest rate in (5) and (8) is an endogenous variable that needs to be instrumented.
Furthermore, the peer-group mean of log consumption growth in equation (5) naturally needs
to be instrumented, as well. Within a forward-looking, rational expectations framework like the
one considered here, every variable that is contained in the current information set basically
provides a valid instrument. A qualiﬁer is necessary insofar as measurement error in levels
or time-aggregation can lead to autocorrelation in growth rates, thus invalidating the ﬁrst
lag of, say, income growth as an instrument for current income growth. Apart from these
considerations on instrument validity, we try throughout to pick instruments that are likely to
contain a lot of information about the endogenous variables. The goal is to have high predictive
power for our endogenous regressors without excessive instrumentation, i.e. without recourse to
many (weak) instruments that simply drive up the degrees of freedom. Moreover, we attempt
to attain a reasonable balance between aggregate and individual-speciﬁc variables. Thus, apart
from all exogenous variables, we use four lags of the real T-Bill rate, four lags of real stock
returns from the S&P 500, the second to fourth lag of the CPI inﬂation rate, the second and
third lag of real income growth and their squares and cubes as well as lagged labor market
status of head and spouse as instruments.
6 Estimation Results
6.1 Results for Equation (5)
We start by estimating (5) using two-step GMM. The exact formulation of the estimator is
described in appendix A4. This appendix also details how we account for sampling variability
in the estimated peer-group means, a variant of the "generated regressor" problem discussed,
for example, in Newey and McFadden (1994).
Table 5 presents point estimates along with appropriately adjusted standard errors in paren-
theses. Note ﬁrst that the estimates tend to lie in a reasonable range, with conﬁdence intervals
suﬃciently small to pin down parameter values quite precisely. The coeﬃcients pertaining to
changes in household size are all of the expected sign and size. For instance, consumption
growth is estimated to rise by roughly 20 %, ceteris paribus, with the arrival of a new major
adult in the household, whereas one additional child increases consumpti o ng r o w t hb yl e s st h a n
10 %. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ appears relatively small, taking a value
17of 0.06. Most importantly, however, the parameter associated with peer-group consumption
growth, γ, indicates strong consumption externalities, with a point estimate of 0.96 and a small
standard error. In addition, the usual speciﬁcation tests lend support to these results in that
the J-statistic clearly fails to reject the model at any conventional level of signiﬁcance.
Table 5: Euler equation estimates incl. peer-group consumption growth
Parameter
∆ family size 0.091
(0.0063)










Estimates account for the presence of generated regressors. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The estimation also includes an intercept as well as direct controls for the stratification variables.
Basically, the results in table 5 indicate that the instruments we use are orthogonal to
deviations of individual consumption growth from its reference group mean, controlling for
other typical regressors. In other words, while consumption within subgroups seems to show
substantial predictable co-movement, deviations from peer-group consumption growth appear
largely unpredictable. Although we have already argued that it is impossible to infer reference
group characteristics from observed behavior, this preliminary result is still noteworthy. It
suggests that there are important predictable trends at the level of the groups we have chosen
to consider. Whether or not the cause lies in actual peer eﬀects, however, has to be investigated
using a framework that is more robust to potential misspeciﬁcation. Indeed, it seems doubtful
whether we should take the high estimates of γ at face value. Given the structure of equation
(5), if our speciﬁcation of demographic controls is incomplete, omitted correlated eﬀects may
easily be mistaken for true consumption externalities. At the same time, the problem may not
become apparent from standard J-tests. Fortunately, the above social equilibrium conditions
provide additional restrictions that we can exploit to obtain more reliable estimates for γ and
the other parameters of the model.
186.2 Results for Equation (8)
Therefore we next turn to the estimation of (8). The ﬁrst column of table 6 displays the results
for our baseline speciﬁcation, which again includes a full set of demographic controls in order
to capture correlated eﬀects associated with our stratiﬁcation variables. All of the estimates
in table 6 account for the presence of generated regressors.
Table 6: Euler equation estimates imposing the social equilibrium condition
Parameter Baseline Specification Excess Sensitivity Test
∆ family size 0.096 0.095
(0.0065) (0.0066)
∆ major adults 0.103  0.106
(0.0183) (0.0192)










All estimates account for the presence of generated regressors. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The estimations also include an intercept as well as direct controls for the stratification variables.
Note ﬁrst that the estimated eﬀects of changes in family composition are virtually identical
to the ones estimated from (5) before. However, imposing the social equilibrium conditions
alters the results with respect to interest rate eﬀects and, most strikingly, the consumption
externality. The direct interest rate eﬀect is now estimated to be somewhat larger with a point
estimate of 0.15, more in line with existing results from the literature. Even more interestingly,
peer-group eﬀects appear to be small and insigniﬁcant now, the parameter estimate being just
0.11 with a standard error of 0.18. Hence the 95 % conﬁdence interval clearly excludes values
of γ above 0.5, let alone such close to one. This is nothing short of a reversal of the results
suggested by table 5 above: once we conduct inference in a framework that is more robust to
misspeciﬁcation, the empirical support for peer eﬀects vanishes almost completely. In addition,
the J-test now rejects the model at the 1 % level, indicating that there are predictable changes
in log consumption growth which cannot be fully explained by the regressors contained in (8).
Thus, the overidentifying restrictions suggest evidence for omitted variables or, put diﬀerently,
against the rational expectations life-cycle model in its current speciﬁcation.
Before addressing the implications of this ﬁnding in greater detail, it seems informative to
19also subject our model to an "economic" test. The second column of table 6 reports results
from a speciﬁcation that includes instrumented current money income growth as an additional
regressor. This speciﬁcation is often referred to as an "excess sensitivity test" of the life-cycle
model. In fact, the theory of intertemporal optimization implies a coeﬃcient of zero for the
added regressor, indicating no impact of predictable income changes on consumption growth.
As can be seen from the table, the coeﬃcient we estimate is indeed small and insigniﬁcant, while
the estimates for all other parameters remain virtually unchanged. Hence our model speciﬁca-
tion passes this "economic" test of the life-cycle model: there is no evidence for consumption
changes that are related to predictable changes in income.
Lastly, table 7 checks the robustness of our results with respect to diﬀerent minimum group
sizes. We re-estimate our baseline model based on data with minimum cell sizes of 10, 20 and
25, respectively. The resulting point estimates are nearly the same as before, with standard
errors increasing as we increase the minimum cell size, most probably because this implies a
loss of observations. Nevertheless, all of our previous ﬁndings are solidly conﬁrmed.
Table 7: Robustness checks for baseline specification
Minimum Minimum Minimum
Parameter Cell Size: 10 Cell Size: 20 Cell Size: 25
∆ family size 0.097 0.098 0.104
(0.0063) (0.0070) (0.0085)
∆ major adults 0.096 0.102 0.099
(0.0178) (0.0187) (0.0202)
∆ children -0.023 -0.023 -0.029
(0.0073) (0.0081) (0.0098)
σ 0.172 0.124 0.122
(0.0707) (0.0677) (0.0949)
γ 0.061  0.163 -0.054
(0.1861) (0.1801) (0.3330)
J-statistic 55.82 38.71 28.27
p-value 0.0000 0.0012 0.0294
Number of Observations 19,843 16,179 13,333
All estimates account for the presence of generated regressors. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The estimations also include an intercept as well as direct controls for the stratification variables.
6.3 Discussion
Taken together, our results suggest that the prima facie evidence in favor of peer eﬀects in
intertemporal consumption has to be taken with great caution. Certainly, our initial estimates
from equation (5) unveiled strong predictable co-movement of consumption within peer groups.
20This can arise either from actual complementarities in consumption or from omitted factors that
are not captured by the theoretical speciﬁcation we consider. The more trustworthy estimates
from equation (8) clearly conﬁrm the latter explanation: once we exploit Manski’s reﬂection
problem framework to improve inference, the empirical support for peer eﬀects appears weak
at best. Speciﬁcally, the estimated values for γ are small and insigniﬁcant throughout.
In this context, the statistical rejection of our baseline model equation is actually quite
instructive in that it helps to explain the apparent contradiction between the results from our
initial regressions (table 5) and those from the estimation of the transformed model (table 6).
They are, in fact, two sides of the same coin: If the estimated peer-group eﬀects in table 5
are really due to omitted factors, the model is misspeciﬁed, even though the J-test may fail
to show it. In this situation, estimation of the transformed model (8) should not only reveal
the omitted variable bias (through lower estimates of γ) but also improve the power of the
associated speciﬁcation tests. This is precisely what we ﬁnd.16
The result of no or mild peer eﬀects may appear surprising. One should note, however,
that our analysis is focused on the precise theoretical implications of the life-cycle model.
Speciﬁcally, the model identiﬁes peer eﬀects with a tendency of smoothing consumption proﬁles
relative to those of relevant peers. This implication, which we cannot conﬁrm in the data, may
be quite distinct from what, in a casual discussion, would be associated with the notion of peer
eﬀects. Thus, the intuitive plausibility of peer eﬀects may not be all that hard to square with
our speciﬁc negative ﬁnding. For one thing, consumption externalities may still be important
for the intratemporal allocation of expenditure on speciﬁc goods, as indicated by the evidence
in Kapteyn et al. (1997). In addition, it is conceivable that peer eﬀects would be conﬁrmed
in behavioral models that depart from a forward-looking rational expectations framework, e.g.
by allowing for myopic "overspending". The latter point is important, because our analysis
leaves open to what extent the life-cycle framework itself may be too restrictive. While J-tests
of our preferred equation (8) imply a statistical rejection of the model, it passes the economic
excess sensitivity test.
The critical touchstone is the presence of predictable components in consumption growth
that are not captured by any of the explanatory variables. However, it is unclear whether
or not the life-cycle model could be further extended, in a convincing fashion, to account for
these omitted factors, or whether there is a more fundamental ﬂaw in the framework. One
view is that the core predictions of the intertemporal optimization framework are borne out
in the data, even if a rich set of preference shifters may have to be added to capture real-
world heterogeneity. In this case, our results would simply indicate that even accounting for
16It should be noted that other economists have estimated Euler equations based on food consumption data
from the PSID without rejecting the model. Examples include Zeldes (1989), Runkle (1991) and Dynan (2000).
Although our results imply a statistical rejection of the model, we do not deem this ﬁnding too surprising. Indeed,
the power of the typical Sargan test is very sensitive to both sample size and instrument choice. Speciﬁcally,
more extensive use of (weak) instruments would clearly work toward a non-rejection of the model in our case,
without changing any of our key results. Irrespectively, since our model nests most of the previous estimation
approches in the literature, results remain comparable.
21some group-speciﬁc demographics already drives down the seeming evidence in favor of peer
eﬀects. A diﬀerent view holds that the life-cycle model keeps missing some essential driving
force of households’ consumption dynamics and that adding more and more demographics
terms would merely immunize the theory against refutation. In line with this view, Souleles
(2005) presents evidence that consumer conﬁdence indices have considerable predictive power
for consumption growth rates, above and beyond the determinants posited by the standard
model. Interestingly, our ﬁndings are compatible with this sceptical view, as well. Indeed,
the information contained in consumer conﬁdence indices might be seen as one of the sources
generating the observed co-movement in consumption within peer groups. Clearly, if such
objections to the life-cycle model have merit, one should seek a superior modelling context
in which to analyze intertemporal consumption. For lack of obvious alternatives, however, we
conﬁne our analysis here to the standard life-cycle setup, which continues to be a building block
of modern economics. Its prominence is witnessed not least by several recent contributions that
have suggested models of intertemporal optimization with consumption externalities to account
for important empirical puzzles in macroeconomics and ﬁnance.
Thus, future work may also confront our results with those obtained from alternative iden-
tiﬁcation approaches within the same framework, or simply from new and better data as they
become available. Either way it will be important to carry on examining the microeconomic
evidence for a modelling device that has become almost commonplace in many macroeconomic
applications. Our evidence, in fact, cautions against the view that the relevance of peer group
eﬀects in life-cycle consumption can be taken for granted.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we make two contributions. First, we derive a framework for analyzing the
importance of peer-group eﬀects, or ”keeping up with the Joneses”, for the dynamic pattern
of household consumption. Second, we confront our model with micro data from the PSID to
obtain empirical evidence on such consumption externalities. Our approach has the advantage
that it fully nests more traditional versions of the life-cycle model. Speciﬁcally, we obtain an
otherwise standard Euler equation that allows individual utility to be also aﬀected by peer-
group consumption.
Starting with a simple IV-type regression of household consumption growth on average
peer-group growth and several controls, we ﬁnd strong evidence for expected consumption co-
movement within reference groups constructed on the basis of age, education, race, gender
and urbanity. This suggests some scope for peer-group eﬀects. However, inference at this
step is very vulnerable to even minor misspeciﬁcation, especially the omission of demographic
control variables. We argue that additional restrictions are required to adequately discriminate
between true consumption externalities and merely correlated eﬀects. Our solution builds on
the ”reﬂection problem” framework developed by Manski (1993, 1995), which we adapt for
the case of dynamic Euler equations with endogenous regressors. This transformation solves
22our inference problem and allows us to distinguish more robustly between the two competing
explanations for the observed co-movement of consumption.
Once the possibility of omitted correlated eﬀects is properly accounted for, our estima-
tion results indicate that there is hardly any evidence for peer-group eﬀects in households’
intertemporal consumption decisions. It thus appears that standard IV-type estimation based
on the extended Euler equation mainly picks up spurious correlation due to neglected common
factors. Hence, while our results do not support the hypothesis of strong peer eﬀects within
the standard life-cycle framework, we also conclude that this framework requires very ﬂexible
speciﬁcations to capture the dynamic pattern of households’ consumption allocations and make
their driving forces visible.
23Appendix
A1: Marginal Utility for Isoelastic Preferences with Peer Eﬀects
The following exposition shows how peer eﬀects can be neatly introduced into the standard
CRRA utility framework that features prominently in much of the consumption literature.
Speciﬁcally, we derive an expression for marginal utility which is nested in the general speciﬁ-
cation we propose in this paper.






























denotes the geometric mean of the current consumption levels
of an individual’s peers. This utility function nests the standard CRRA case for γ =0 .N o t e
further that we use the geometric mean primarily for the sake of analytical convenience in
deriving a linearized Euler equation. However, it could also be motivated by considering its
favorable properties with respect to the susceptibility to outliers.





























































This representation corresponds with the equation, (3), we use for modelling marginal utility.
A2: Derivation of the Euler Equation
This section follows the derivations in Attanasio and Browning (1995). We start with the











(1 +e εt+1), (14)
where e εt+1 denotes an expectational error with Et [e εt+1]=0 . Taking logs, we obtain
lnu0 (Ct)=l nβ +l nu0 (Ct+1)+l nRt+1 +l n( 1+e εt+1). (15)
Note that, by Jensen’s inequality, the error term now has nonzero expectation:
Et [ln(1 +e εt+1)] ≤ ln(Et [1 +e εt+1]) = 0. (16)




























+l nu0 (Ct+1)+l nRt+1 + ζt+1

















=0 . Hence, the new error term has again zero expectation
under a variety of diﬀerent possible assumptions, e.g. homoskedastic expectation errors across
households and over time.17 As a consequence of the approximation, omitted higher-order
moments are buried in the intercept. Although this makes it impossible to recover the individual
time preference rate β, we can still consistently estimate all other preference parameters under
the above assumptions.




























































17A more primitive condition implying the above restriction is to assume joint log-normality of the relevant
variables. Although fairly restrictive, such an assumption is not uncommon in the literature on estimating
linearized Euler equations. Alternatively and less restrictive, we would obtain a similar estimating equation by













































+σ lnRt+1 + σζt+1.































+σ lnRt+1 + σζt+1 +  t+1,
where  t+1 denotes the additional approximation error. While this last approximation is not
required for estimation in a standard Euler equation framework, it will prove very convenient
for the later derivation of further equilibrium conditions that will be needed to distinguish
between true consumption externalities and merely correlated eﬀects. Note also that the above
approximation is very accurate, because all but one of the stratiﬁcation variables we consider
never change for a given household over time.18 In particular, for the predominant case in
which strata in t and t +1are composed by the same households, the induced approximation
error term is identically zero by construction. Moreover, even a more substantial approximation
error would not pose a problem, as long as it is uncorrelated with the instruments used in the
estimation.
Finally, introducing some short-hand notation for the intercept and error terms, we can




















+ σ lnRt+1 + εt+1, (21)
which coincides with equation (4) in the paper.
A3: Data Cleaning Procedures and Sample Selection
In total, our original sample contains 90,414 household year observations. We match household
information across years by means of the history of interview numbers provided with each wave
of the PSID. Where matching is not possible (for example, because information on interview
numbers from past years is missing) or ambiguous, we drop the respective observations from the
sample. In total, these deletions amount to a loss of 2,198 household years. We then proceed
by cleaning our sample from observations with implausible, missing or topcoded information.
Speciﬁcally, we delete 3,227 observations because of a zero in reported food expenditures at
18Age, gender, race and education (as deﬁned for our purposes) are entirely time-invariant in our data. Thus,
only our measure of "urbanity" displays some (very limited) temporal variation.
26home, 92 because of topcoding of this variable, 27 because of topcoded food expenditures at
restaurants, and 1,896 because of bad accuracy codes indicating that the respective information
is poorly measured. Further, we only consider households whose head is between 18 and 65
years old. This restrictions leads to the deletion of another 10,094 household years.
Note that our data set is an unbalanced panel, because split-oﬀs are treated as independent
households from the moment of the split-oﬀ. Moreover, we also treat households with a head
change as new households. The year in which the head change occurs is deleted from the
sample (5,991 household years). We delete 344 observations for which there is no educational
information, 288 observations because the household did not reside in continental USA, 60
household years because of missing race information and four because there is no major adult
present in the respective household and year.
As the PSID was mainly designed to study the income dynamics of the poor, it signiﬁcantly
oversamples these households relative to the population. We follow the literature and leave
the entire poverty subsample out of consideration. This means the loss of another 21,335
observations. Lastly, as we are interested in estimating a consumption Euler equation, we also
have to discard households that are observed for a single year only (1,233 observations). In
total, the above data cleaning procedures amount to a deletion of 44,972 household years, which,
nevertheless, leaves us with a fairly large sample consisting of 43,244 observations. However,
we must also discard observations with missing values for the individual-speciﬁc instruments
used in the estimation. These deletions leave us with a sample of 26,358 observations. Lastly,
in order to eliminate the inﬂuence of extreme outliers we also eliminate the observations with
the 0.75% highest and lowest consumption growth rates leading to a loss of 396 observations.
After having constructed our peer groups as stated in the text, we still have to delete house-
hold years that are associated with groups consisting of less than 15 observations. Deletions
related to small group sizes amount to a loss of 7,836, thus yielding a ﬁnal sample of 18,126
observations, on which we conduct our analysis. Thus, although our necessary cleaning pro-
cedures substantially reduce the size of the data set, we are still left with a suﬃciently big
baseline sample of more than 18,000 observations to conduct meaningful inference.
A4: Econometric Issues
Estimation
As all of the above models are formulated within a forward-looking, rational expectations
framework, they give rise to conditional moment restrictions that lend themselves to semipara-
metric estimation using GMM. Speciﬁcally, estimation is based on the orthogonality conditions
implied by rational expectations, coupled with the standard assumption that instruments are
uncorrelated with higher-order moments buried in the intercept, due to the linearization.19
Further, in this framework it is straightforward to account for the endogeneity of the house-
holds’ after-tax interest rates as well as the relevant peer-group means in equations (5) and
19See, for example, Attanasio and Browning (1995), p. 1125.
27(8), by excluding these variables from the instrument set and including other (lagged) variables
instead. Hence, the starting point is a set of moment conditions of the form
Et [ut+1|zt]=0 , (22)
where ut+1 represents the error term from the respective Euler equation and zt denotes the set
of instrumental variables contained in the information set of period t. A necessary condition
for identiﬁcation is that the dimension of the instrument set be larger or equal to the number
of parameters we want to estimate. Following the literature on Euler equation estimation, we
transform the set of conditional moment restrictions into unconditional ones. Estimation thus
exploits moment conditions of the following type:
Et [ut+1zt]=0 . (23)
Dropping time subscripts for notational convenience and specifying the determinants of the
expectation error u,w ec a nw r i t e
E [uz]=E [f (y,z,w,ARITM [·|g (X)],κ)] = 0, (24)
where f (·) now summarizes the dependence of the moment condition on the regressands y,t h e
instruments z, the standard regressors w, the reference group means ARITM [·|g (X)] and the
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for the diﬀerent reference groups by year and characteristics X
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Estimation of unconditional moment models of the form (24) is suﬃciently standard. Be-
cause of the nonlinearities in (8), we use numerical optimization to obtain nonlinear GMM
estimates. Throughout this paper, we only report results from two-stage estimation, noting
that the results remain virtually unchanged if further iterations are carried out (iterated GMM).
It is worthwhile to keep this in mind, as iterated GMM is normalization-invariant, while two-
stage GMM is not. The fact that our results are not sensitive to the number of iterations also
rules out the issue that Sargan tests may be adversely aﬀected by diﬀerences in normalization.
The presence of generated regressors in both (5) and (8) leads to additional complications.







are estimated in a separate ﬁrst
step, we must account for the sampling variability associated with the respective estimates
ARITMN [·|g (X)] to conduct proper inference. This is of great importance, given that we
would like to uncover possible peer eﬀects at the population level rather than within our sample
only.20 The next section contains a brief discussion of how we make the required adjustments.
20Most empirical studies of social interactions do not account for the presence of ﬁrst-stage estimates when
conducting inference. While such an approach may be sensible for the case of "local" interactions prevalent
within a speciﬁc sample, e.g. neighborhood eﬀects, it is clearly inadequate for studying large-group social eﬀects
based on a random sample of the whole population of interest.
28Inference
To obtain consistent variance estimates in the presence of generated regressors, we follow Newey
and McFadden (1994) and adopt a "joint GMM" interpretation for the two estimation steps.
Basically, we "stack" the respective moment conditions from both estimation steps to form an
extended vector of moments. The derivations are considerably simpliﬁed by formulating the
moment conditions for both steps with reference to the entire sample rather than by individual






with t =1 ,..,T and j =1 ,...,G t denote a dummy equal to
one at time t if household h has characteristics X
j
t and zero otherwise. For any given household
h and time t, there is exactly one dummy equal to one, i.e. the dummy corresponding to her
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t λ + ut+1.
The number of generated regressors in each case is given by the number of estimated
reference group means times the number of group years for which they have to be estimated.
Thus, we have 553 and 2,212 generated regressors in the ﬁrst and second case, respectively.
The advantage of re-writing the model in this way is that we can now express the estimated








as coeﬃcients from ﬁrst-step OLS regressions of







estimated on the entire sample. The additional moment conditions that will account
for the sampling variability introduced by the ﬁrst-step estimates are then nothing but the
scores of these auxiliary OLS regressions. The structure of the scores is relatively simple:
their components are the products of residuals and dummy variables, with all but one of the
latter being identical zero by construction. Hence, many of the additional ﬁrst-step moment
conditions can be conveniently ignored. Moreover, since both ﬁrst- and second-step moment
conditions are deﬁned for the full sample, corrected variance estimates can be computed using
the techniques presented in Newey and McFadden (1994).







Further, let m(v,d(X),ARITM[·|g(X)]) denote the scores of the ﬁrst-step regression gener-
ating the group averages of the relevant variables v. Then our ﬁrst-step moment conditions are
obviously given by
E [m(v,d(X),ARITM[·|g (X)])] = 0. (27)
Since the estimates for ARITM [·|g(X)] are used as (generated) regressors in the second step,
we can now write the corresponding second-step moment conditions as
E [f (y,z,w,ARITMN [·|g(X)],κ)] = 0, (28)
where the
√
N-consistent estimator for reference group means, ARITMN [·|g(X)], has replaced
the true population counterparts, ARITM [·|g (X)]. Applying Newey and McFadden (1994,
Theorem 6.1), we obtain an asymptotic distribution for the structural parameter estimates b κ
of the second stage given by
√










f (·)=f (y,z,w,ARITM [·|g(X)],κ) (31)
Fκ = E [∇κf (y,z,w,ARITM [·|g (X)],κ)] (32)
FARITM = E [∇ARITMf (y,z,w,ARITM [·|g(X)],κ)] (33)
M = E [∇ARITMm(v,d(X),ARITM[·|g (X)])] (34)
Ψ(v,d(X)) = −M−1m(v,d(X),ARITM[·|g (X)]), (35)
where ∇κ and ∇ARITM denote partial derivatives with respect to κ and ARITM [·|g (X)],
respectively.
Each component of the adjusted variance matrix can be computed from its corresponding
sample analog. Note that the adjustment for the presence of generated regressors is embodied
in the expression FARITMΨ(v,d(X)) in (30). It is fairly easy to check that for each variable
over which we estimate peer-group means, this correction matrix amounts to the negative
deviations of a household’s own realizations from the respective peer-group means multiplied by
the respective peer-group coeﬃcients and the average realizations of the instruments among the
peers. Thus, for the extreme case in which there are no social interactions at all, the correction
terms become zero and the variance formula collapses to the standard one.21 Intuitively,
sampling variability in the estimation of the reference group means is irrelevant for cases in
21In this case FARITM =0holds.
30which there are no social interactions. On the other hand, the correction may become large
depending on the estimated reference group coeﬃcient as well as the sampling variability in
the variables for which the means are estimated.
One ﬁnal comment is in order: Since we use the estimated reference group means of the
exogenous variables as both regressors and instruments, it might seem that further adjust-
ments for the presence of generated instruments are required. This is not true, however, as
all measurable functions of any predated variable provide valid instruments. Thus, given our
conditional moment restrictions, the generated instruments have no eﬀect on the asymptotic
variance of the GMM estimator.22
22See Wooldridge (2002) p. 400 ﬀ. for a more detailed discussion.
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